FEDERAL INTERVENTION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT by COLLINS, CHARLES WALLACE
YALE LAW JOURNAL
FEDERAL INTERVENTION UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By Charles Wallace Collins, M.A., Sometime Fellow in the
University of Chicago. Member of the Alabama Bar.
It is not the purpose of this article to enter into a discussion of
the philosophy of the relation of the States to the Federal govern-
ment, nor to give an exhaustive treatment of the cases here cited.
It is proposed to show in outline the development and trend of the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in its direct and positive
restraint upon the several States within the past forty-three years.
The attempt is made to set forth the different spheres of State
activity affected and the various classes of laws which have been
annulled in whole or in part.
From the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1868 to the close of its last term, the Supreme Court of the
United States has handed down six hundred and four opinions
under that article of the Constitution. Of these applications for
Federal intervention by way of restraining or annulling State
action, only fifty-five were decided adversely to the states-that
is to say about nine per cent.
The accompanying chart reveals something of the history and
the trend of these instances of intervention. Prior to 1885 there
were four such cases, each of which involved the negro race ques-
tion. These grew out of the problems of the Reconstruction.
Since 1886 there have been only two cases of intervention on mat-
ters relating to the negro race, while every other instance except
twelve has been in behalf of a private corporation seeking relief
from State activity, to wit: thirty-nine cases.
For this entire period of forty-three years Federal intervention
under the amendment has affected four State constitutions, thirty-
two statutes and nine city ordinances, and State procedure-
administrative, executive or judicial-has been restrained eleven
times. Thirty-six of these cases reached the Supreme Court of
the United States by writ of error to the State court, sixteen by
appeal from injunctions in the inferior Federal courts and three
by other appeals from the Federal courts. Within the past five
years nearly one-half of the cases of Federal intervention have
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been by the way of Federal injunctions. Out of the total number
of cases of intervention twenty-one involved the interpretation of
some other clause of the Constitution, eight of these being the
commerce clause. In eight cases the merits were left undecided,
and in thirty-eight-a little over one-half-there were dissenting
opinions.
It is apparent that all of these cases are not of equal importance.
Some of them involve the technicalities of legal procedure. Others
deal with questions no longer alive in the body politic. Others
annul statutes and declare principles of prime importance. While
the total number of interventions is not significant as compared
with the total number of opinions handed down, yet their effect
has been far-reaching on the relations of the States to the Federal
government. The restraining of the activity of one State lays
down in some measure the metes and bounds for the other States.
Social and economic movements involving several States have
been thus checked in their incipiency.
Let us now pass to a more definite consideration of these
instances of intervention with a view of seeing more clearly this
phase of the practical operation of the amendmerit. We shall
consider first certain miscellaneous cases of more or less import-
ance, but which represent isolated instances of Federal interven-
tion. We shall then proceed to study the more important groups.
i. Presumption of death. Under probate procedure in the State
of Washington, a certain man having been absent from the State
for seven years, and whose whereabouts were unknown, was
declared to be dead and letters of administration were issued. He
subsequently reappeared and brought suit in ejectment to recover
the land. An adverse decision having been rendered by the State
courts, upon writ of error, the Supreme Court of the United
States declared such action of the State violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
2. Service of process. A Texas court served process on a
defendant in Virginia, summoning him to appear in the Texas
court within five days. This action was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Texas. Upon writ of error the Supreme Court of the
United States declared the notice insufficient as depriving the
defendant of due process of law in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 Fuller, C. J., and Brewer, J., dissented.
'Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S., 34. Oct. Term, 1893.2 Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S., 398. Oct. Term, 1899.
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3. Eninent domain. (a) Procedure in Kentucky to condemn
certain lands for a right of way.3  On the ground of the non-
residence of the defendant, and under the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case was removed to
the Federal court. A Federal injunction was thenceforth issued
to restrain further proceedings in the State court. On appeal
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the injunction.
The merits of the case were not decided.4  Fuller, C. J., Holmes,
Brewer and Peckham, JJ., dissented.
(b) Condemnation of certain lands under a New York statute
for the purpose of an elevated railroad.5  Injunctions were
sought in the State courts by property owners to prevent alleged
damages to easements. The contract clause of the Constitution
was the predominant issue although violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was set up. Relief having
been denied by the State courts, upon the proper proceedings had,
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the contention of
the parties aggrieved. 6  Holmes, J., Fuller, C. J., White and
Peckham, JJ., dissented. Brown, J., concurred in the result.
4. Public health. A law was passed in the State of New York
limiting the working period of employees in bakeries to a maxi-
mum of sixty hours per week.' Suit was brought to test the
constitutionality of this law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State courts of New York held it to be a valid exercise of the
police power. Upon writ of error the Supreme Court of the
United States declared the same void on the ground that it oper-
ated to violate the liberty of contract under the due process of
law clause of the amendment." Harlan, White and Day, JJ.,
dissented. Holmes, J., dissented in a separate opinion.
5. Conservation of natural resources. A statute of Oklahoma
prohibited the transportation of natural gas from the State and
otherwise regulated the transportation of natural gas within the
3Kentucky Stat., Sec. 835-839.
4 Madisonville Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S., 239. Oct. Term,
1904.
New York Laws, 1892, Chap. 339.
6 Muhlker v. N. Y. &' Harlem R. R. Co., 197 U. S., 544. Oct. Term,
1904.
Birrell v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., 198 U. S., 390. Oct. Term, 1904.
-New York Laws, 1897, Ch. 415, Art. 8, Sec. 110.
s Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S., 45. Oct. Term, 1904.
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State. A foreign gas company secured a Federal injunction,
restraining the execution of the statute on the ground of violation
of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and also of
deprivation of property without due process of law in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The commerce clause was
the predominant issue. On appeal by the State the injunction
was sustained.10  Holmes, Lurton and Hughes, JJ., dissented.
6. Anti-trust legislation. A statute of Illinois for the pre-
vention of monopolies, exempted agricultural products and live
stock in the hands of the producer from the operation of the law.",
On appeal from proceedings in a Federal court, the Supreme
Court of the United States declared the act void on the ground
that the exemption above mentioned denied the equal protection
of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
iMcKenna, J., dissented.
7. City problems. (i) Regulation of the price of gas. The
city of Peoria, Illinois, passed an ordinance fixing the maximum
price of gas at seventy-five cents per one thousand cubic feet of
eighteen candle power."3 The gas company petitioned for a
Federal injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance
on the grounds that the rate violated the contract clause of the
Constitution and was confiscatory by virtue of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon a denial of the
petition by the lower court an appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States whereupon the lower court was
reversed and ordered to grant a temporary injunction pending
the taking of testimony. 14 The merits of the case were not
decided.
(2) Prescribing lawful territory for gas works. An ordinance
of Los Angeles limited the erection of gas works to certain sec-
tions of the city. A later amendment made some changes in the
territory prescribed by the original ordinance, thereby excluding
from the lawful territory a certain gas plant.' Upon proceed-
" Oklahoma Laws, 1907, Ch. 67.
10 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S., 229. Oct. Term,
1910.
"'Laws of Illinois, 1893, p. 182.
12 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540. Oct. Term, 1901.
'13 Peoria Ordinance, Sept. 4, 1900.
14 Gas Co. v. Peoria, 200 U. S., 49. Oct. Term, 1905.
1"Los Angeles Ordinance, Aug. 26, 1901; amended Nov. 25, 1901.
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ings in the State courts, the owner of the gas works set up the
claim that the amendment of the original ordinance deprived him.
of his property without due process of law in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The State courts upheld the validity
of the ordinance. Upon writ of ertor the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the amendment to the ordinance was "an
arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power" and
therefore void by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment."
(3) Public convenience and safety. The city of San Fran-
cisco passed an ordinance regulating certain phases of the laundry
business.' 7  Certain Chinese set up the claim that the manner in
which it was being enforced deprived them'of the equal protec-
tion of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment-
Upon certain proceedings had in the State courts and in the lower
Federal court, the matter was decided in favor of the city. Upon
appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States
both the State and the Federal courts were reversed and the con-
tention of the Chinese upheld.
18
(4) Street improvement. The ordinances, one involving an
assessment for street paving in Des Moines against the property
of a non-resident, and the other a proceeding to condemn certain
property for opening a street in the village of Norwood, Ohio,
were held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be in
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-
The Iowa case was tried in the State courts.1 ' In the Ohio case
a Federal injunction was allowed restraining the enforcement of
the ordinance.2 0  Brewer, Gray and Shiras, JJ., dissented.
(5) Regulation of street railways. An ordinance of the-city
of Cleveland, Ohio, fixed the title to certain rails, poles, and other
apparatus owned by the street railway company, in the city, to
take effect at the expiration of the franchise. 21  The company
procured a Federal injunction restraining the enforcement of the
ordinance on the ground of the violation of the contract clause of
the Constitution and also, of the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Upon appellate proceedings this con-
16 Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S., 223. Oct. Term, 1904.
17 San Francisco Ordinance. May 26, 1880 and June 28, 1880.
1S Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356. Oct. Term, 1885.
19 Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193. Oct. Term, 1898.
20 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S., 269. Oct. Term, 1898.
21 Cleveland Ordinance. Jan. 11, 1904.
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tention was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.22
(6) Regulation of telephone rates. The enforcement of an
ordinance of Memphis, Tennessee, regulating telephone rates, 2
was enjoined by the Federal court upon the petition of the tele-
phone company. A permanent injunction was allowed on the
ground that the rates were confiscatory in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal by the
city the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the appel-
late proceedings on the ground that the Federal question under
the Amendment did not properly appear from the pleadings.2 4
White, C. J., McKenna and Hughes, JJ., dissented.
(7) Taxation. (a) An ordinance of the city of New Orleans
imposing a license tax of $6,250 on the American Sugar Refining
Company.25  Proceedings in the State court were removed to the
Federal court, on the ground of the non-residence of the company.
At the trial the company set us as its defense the violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Verdict
having been rendered in favor of the city, the case was taken to
the Circuit Court of Appeals on writ of error, where it was dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction. On further appellate proceed-
ings in the Supreme Court the Circuit Court of Appeals was
reversed, the Court holding that it had jurisdiction of the consti-
tutional question involved having already jurisdiction by virtue of
the non-residence of the company30 The merits were not decided.
(b) An ordinance of the village of New Hope, Pennsylvania,
fixing a license tax of one dollar for each pole and two and one-
half dollars for each mile of wire of the telegraph company. The
State courts upheld the ordinance. The Supreme Court of the
United States, upon writ of error, declared the same void both as
a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution and of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the rate being'
considered unreasonably high.2 7 Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dis-
sented.
22 Cleveland Elec. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 204 U. S., 116. Oct. Term,
1906.
23Memphis Ordinance, Sept. 24, 1907.
24 Memphis v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 218 U. S., 624. Oct. Term, 1910.
25 New Orleans Ordinance, 1898, under La. Act No. 171 of 1898.
206 An:. Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S., 277. Oct. Term,
1900.
27 Postal-Tel: Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S., 55. Oct. Term, 1903.
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(c) Procedure by the city council of Denver, Colorado, sitting.
as a board of equalization under the city charter,2 fixing tax
assessments. The defendant in-this case claimed that the assess-
ment was void by virtue of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in that he was given no opportunity to be
heard. Having been denied relief by the State courts, upon writ
of error the Supreme Court of the United States upheld his con-
tention.29 Fuller, C. J., and Holmes, J., dissented.
8. The Negro race question. There have been six instances of
Federal intervention under the amendment on this point ;30 four
growing out of ante-bellum or: reconstruction laws and procedure,
and two others-one in 1899 and the other in 1903. Each involve
the single question of excluding negroes from the jury service.
In none of them were the merits of the alleged discrimination
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In four of
these cases there were dissenting opinions."'
9. State ta.xation. (i) Validity of assessment. (a) Proced-
ure under the laws of Georgia3 2 to collect back taxes from a rail-
road. The company set up the claim in the State courts that the
enforcement of this law deprived it of its property without due
process of law as provided by the F6urteenth Amendment. The
State courts decided in favor of the validity of the statute. Upon
writ of error the Supreme Court of the United States sustained
the contention of the railroad company.33
(b)Assessment by the Cook County Board of Equalization
under the laws of Illinois.34  The Chicago Traction Co. and six
other corporations, upon petition in the Federal court secured an
injunction restraining the collection of taxes under the above
2s Denver Charter, 1893, Art. 7, See. 3, 29-31.
2 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S., 373. Oct. Term, 1907.
30 Strauder v. West Va., 100 U. S., 303. Oct. Term, 1879.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., 339. Oct. Term, 1879.
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., 370. Oct. Term, 1880.
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S., 110. Oct. Term, 1882.
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S., 442. 'Oct. Term, 1899.
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S., 226. Oct. Term, 1903.
3' See American Law Review, 1911, pp. 835-41, 850-51; The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Negro Race Question, Collins.
32 Georgia Political Code, Sec. 804-5, 812-14, 847, 855, 874, 879.
33 Cent. Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, Compr., 207 U. S., 127. Oct. Term,
1907.
-4 Coust. Ill., 1870, Art. 9,- Sec. 1, and Hurd's Rev. Stat., 1899.
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assessment on the ground that the rates were discriminatory,
thereby depriving them of the equal protection of the laws. On-
appeal by the county, the Supreme Court of the United States
sustained the injunction.3 Holmes and Moody, JJ., dissented.
(2) Taxation of personal property when the sitits is in another
State. (a) Pennsylvania. Taxation of coal in West Virginia.
o'rned by a Pennsylvania railroad .3 Upon proper proceedings
the State courts were reversed by the 'Supreme Court of the
United States and the assessment held void as a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Fuller, C. J.,
dissented.
(b) Kentucky. Taxation of cars in Indiana owned by a Ken-
tucky railroad under a statute subjecting the personal property of
all citizens of Kentucky to taxation in that State regardless of the
situs.s. The law was declared valid by the State courts. Upon
appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States
it was pronounced void in that it took property without due pro-
cess of law and denied the equal protection of the laws, in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment." Holmes, J., and Fuller,
C. J., dissented.
Kentucky. Taxation of a franchise in Indiana. 40 The proceed-
ings were similar to the above, the tax being held void under the
due process clause of the amendment.4' Fuller, C. J., and Shiras,
J., dissented.
Kentucky. Taxation of whiskey stored in Germany by owners
in Kentucky who held the warehouse receipts. The tax was
declared void under the due process clause of the amendment
under procedure similar to the above.42
(3) Taxation of personal property when the owner thereof is
a non-resident of the State. (a) Indiana. Taxation of notes
owned in New York and payable in Ohio. The amount involved
was $75o,ooo. The Indiana assessment was $36,357.71. The
33 Raymond, Treas. v. Chicago Trac. Co., 207 U. S., 20. Oct. Term,
1907.
36Penn. Laws, 1891, p. 229.
37 Del., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Penn., 198 U. S., 341. Oct. Term, 1904.
3s Sec. 4020, Ky. Stat.
39 Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194. Oct. Term, 1905.
40 Sec. 4077, et seq. Ky. Rev. Stat.
4
'Louis-ville, etc.,- Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S., 385. Oct. Term,
1902.
42 Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S., 200. Oct. Term, 1908.
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notes were sent to Indiana presumbaly to escape taxation in Ohio.
Proceedings in the State courts resulted in a verdict for the State.
Upon writ of error the Supreme Court of the United States
declared the tax void in that it was a taking of property without
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.43
Day and Brewer, JJ., dissented.
(b) Louisiana. Taxation of credit notes and bank deposits
held in New Orleans by a corporation of New York.44 The amount
involved was $636,90. An injunction from the Federal court
Testraining the collection of the tax was sustained on appeal, by
the Supreme Court of the United States under the due process
clause of the amendment as in the above case. 45 Brewer, J., dis-
.sented.
(4) Franchise taxes on corporations. (a) California. Upon
suit by the State the company petitioned for a removal of the
cause to the Federal court under Act of Congress, March 3, 1875,
as a suit arising under the Constitution of the United States, vio-
lation of the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment being alleged. Upon a denial of the
petition by the State courts and proper proceedings had, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided in favor of the peti-
tioner.4
8
(b) Kansas. A statute fixing a charter fee for corporations
based on a certain per cent of the entire capital stock, the same to
be paid into the school fund of the State.47 In this case the fee
was $2o,Ioo. After proceedings in the State courts in which the
law was held valid, the Supreme Court of the United States, upon
writ of error, declared the statute void in that (i) it imposed a
burden on interstate commerce and (2) it violated the due process
and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
in taxing property beyond the limits of the State. The defendant
was a foreign corporation. The commerce clause was the pre-
dominant issue.48 Fuller, C. J., Holmes, McKenna, and Peckham,
JJ., dissented.
43 Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S., 392. Oct. Term, 1906.
44 La. Acts, 1898, No. 170.
4' New Orleans v. Aew York Life Ins. Co., 216 U. S., 517. Oct. Term,
1909.
46 Sou. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Cal., 118 U. S., 109. Oct. Term, 1885.
47 Kan. Gen. Stat., 1901, p. 280.
48 West. Uniont Tel. Co. v. Kan., 216 U. S., 1. Oct. Term, 1909.
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Kansas. The same statute brought in question in quo warranto
proceedings against the Pullman Company with the same result
as in the above.49 Fuller, C. J., Holnhes and McKenna, JJ., dis-
.sented.
(c) Arkansas. A statute known as the Wingo Act fixed the
-charter fee of foreign corporations on the same basis as the
Kansas law above mentioned. 0 The charter fee in this case was
$25,o5o. A Federal injunction restraining the enforcement of the
statute was sustained on appeal by the State, on the authority of
the opinions in the Kansas cases.5 ' Fuller, C. J., Holmes and
McKenna, JJ., dissented.
(d) Alabama. A statute classifying corporations into foreign
:and domestic and fixing a charter fee for foreign corporations at
-a certain per cent of the entire capital stock in use within the
borders of the State.12  After proceedings in the State courts in
-which the statute was upheld, the Supreme Court of the United
States declared it void in that it deprived the foreign corpora-
tions, doing business within the State, of the equal protection of
the laws, in contraventiot; of the Fourteenth Amendment.3j
Fuller, C. J., Holmes and McKenna, JJ., dissented.
IO. State regulation of public service corporations. (i) Stock
-yards. Kansas. A statute regulating public stock yards, fixing
charges, prescribing duties, and fixing penalties.5 4 A federal
injunction restraining the enforcement of the statute was sus-
-tained by the Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal by
-the State, on the ground that the statute operated only against the
Kansas City Stock Yards Company, thereby violating the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
(2) Insurance companies. (a) Louisiana. A statute prohib-
iting the dealing with foreign insurance companies which had not
complied with the laws of Louisiana.56 The law was declared
valid by the State courts. Upon writ of error the Supreme Court
49Pullnzan Co. v. Kan., 216 U. S., 156. Oct. Term, 1909.
50 Ark. Laws, 1907, p. 744.
r
1 Ludwig v. Western U. Tel. Co., 216 U. S., 146. Oct. Term, 1909.
5 2Alabama Code, 1907, Vol. I, p. 986, Sec. 2391-2400.
3 Sou. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., 400. Oct. Term, 1909.
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Gaston, 216 U. S., 418. Oct. Term, 1909.
Cent. Ga. Ry. Co. v. Gaston, 216 U. S., 418. Oct. Term, 1909.
5 4 Kansas Laws, March 3, 1897.
5 Cotthig v. Kan. City Stock Yds. Co., 183 U. S., 79. Oct. Term, 1901.
-5 Louisiana Laws, 1894, No. 66.
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of the United States held that it violated the due process clause of
the Amendment in that it worked a deprivation of the liberty of
contract.5"
(b) Indiana. Pennsylvania. A judgment was received in a
Pennsylvania State court against an insurance company under a
statute providing that service of process on the insurance com-
missioner was sufficient notice.58 "Full faith and credit" was
given this judgment in the Indiana courts. Upon writ of error
the Supreme Court of the United States declared both judgments
void in that the service on the insurance commissioner was insuf-
ficient, thereby violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9
(3) Recovery of land from railroads. Texas. A suit in 189P
to recover certain sections of land from a railroad company under
a legislative grant in 1866 on the ground that the grant was made
without authority.60 Judgment having been rendered for the
State in the State courts, upon proceedings in the Supreme Court
of the United States the State courts were reversed under the
contract clause of the Constitution and under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The contract clause was
the predominant issue.61
(4) Regulation of the collection of claims against railroads,
Texas. A statute allowing a ten dollar attorney's fee as a part of
the judgment for the plaintiff on certain claims against railroads
under certain conditions. 2 After being upheld in the courts of
the State, the statute was declared void by the Supreme Court of
the United States in that it violated the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Armendment.63  Gray, J.,
Fuller, C. J., and White, J., dissented.
(5) Regulation of railroad profits. Indiana. A statute regulat-
ing the profits of railroads within the state.14  In this case the
construction of a charter of 1847 was involved. Upon proceed-
57 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. E., 578. Oct. Term, 1896.
58 Penn. Laws, June 20, 1883.
59 Old Wayne Life Ins. Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S., 8. Oct. Term,
1906.
60 Constitution of Texas, 1869, Sec. 6, Art. 10.
61Housfon & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 170 U.S.., 243. Oct. Term,
1897.
a2Sayles Supp. Tex. Civil Stat., p. 768, Art. 4266a.
63 Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S., 150. Oct. Term, 1896.
4 Indiana Laws, Jan. 27, Feb. 24, and March 4, 1897.
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ings by writ of error the Supreme Court of the United States
declared the law violative of the contract clause of the Constitu-
tion and of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The contract clause was the predominant issue.05
(6) Compulsory improvement of the railroad service. (a)
Nebraska. An order of the State Board of Transportation com-
pelling a railroad company to allow the erection of certain grain
elevators on its right of way.66 A mandamus was awarded by the
State court to enforce this order. Upon writ of error the Supreme
Court of the United States declared the proceedings to be in vio-
lation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67
(b) Nebraska. A statute compelling railroad companies to
construct and maintain certain sidetracks and switches for certain
grain elevators adjacent to the right of way. 8 After procedure
in the State courts upholding the statute the Supreme Court of
the United States declared it unconstitutional on the grounds men-
ioned in the preceding case.69 Harlan and M\IcKenna, JJ., dis-
sented.
(c) Kentucky. A provision of the State Constitution com-
pelling railroad companies, under certain conditions, to deliver
cars to other railroads.7  After procedure in the State courts
upholding the constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the
United States declared it void in that it placed a burden on inter-
state commerce and violated the due process clause of the Fouir-
teenth Amendment."' McKenna, Harlan and Moody, JJ., dis-
sented.
(7) Regulation of the rates of common carriers. (a) Texas,
Fixing the rates by the Railroad Commission.7 2 A Federal injunc-
tion was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States,
on appeal by the State, on the ground that the proposed rates
worked a deprivation of property without due process of law and
denied the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Four-
65 T. H. & Ind. R. R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U. S., 579. Oct. Term, 1903.
66 Dec. 13, 1889.
07 Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Neb., 164 U. S., 403. Oct. Term, 1896.
68 Nebraska Session Laws, 1905, Ch. 105, Sec. 1, 6.
60 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Neb., 217 U. S., 196. Oct. Term, 1909.
70 Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 213-14.
71L. & N.'R. R. Co. v. Cent. Stock Yds. Co., 212 U. S., 132. Oct.
Term, 1908.
' 72 Texas Laws, April 3, 1891.
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teentkAmendment. The Eleventh Amendment was also involved.73
(b) Minnesota. 1887. An order of the Railroad and Ware-
house Commission fixing rates.74 A mandamus was awarded by
the State courts to compel compliance- with the order. Upon
writ of error the Supreme Court of the United States annulled
the order on the ground that it violated the due process and the
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that
the notice of the hearing was insufficient.75 Bradley, Gray and
Lamar, JJ., dissented.
(c) Minnesota. 1907. Certain statutes provided for a two-cent
passenger rate and the regulation of freight rates.7 Penalties
were also fixed. A Federal injunction was allowed restraining the
attorney general of the State from enforcing the statute on the
ground that such enforcement would work a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. The attorney general refused to obey the injunction
and was thereupon confined for contempt. He petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the United States
on the ground that the injunction was in violation of the Eleventh
Amendment. His petition was denied. The merits of the rate
law were not decided.77 Harlan, J., dissented.
(d) Kentucky. A statute reducing tolls.78 An injunction was
granted by the State courts to prevent a contravention of the
statute. Upon writ of error the Supreme Court of the United
States dissolved the injunction on the ground that the statute was
a prima facie violation of the due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The merits were not
decided.7"
(e) Kentucky. An order of the Railroad Commission fixing
general tariff rates.8 0  A Federal injunction preventing the
enforcement of the order was sustained by the Supreme Court of
" Reagan v. Farmers Loam & Trust Co., 154 U. S., 362. Oct. Term,
1893.
Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Go, 154 U. S., 413. Oct. Term, 1893.
74 Minn. Gen. Laws, Ch. 10, 1887.
,5 Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Min., 134 U. S., 418. Oct. Term,
1889.
76 Mim. Rate Laws, 1905, 1906, 1907.
7EX parte Young, 209 U. S., 125. Oct. Term, 1907.
78 Kentucky Laws, 1890.
7o Covington Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S., .578. Oct. Term, 1896.
o Kentucky Laws, March 10, 1900.
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the United States, on appeal by the State, under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on
the ground that the commission exceeded its authority. The
commerce clause was also involved.8'
(f) Nebraska. An order of the Board of Transportation fixing
freight rates.8 2 A Federal injunction restraining the enforcement
of the order was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States, on appeal by the State, under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground
that the rates were too low.83
(g) Nebraska. This was a further attempt to enforce the above
mentioned rate law. A Federal injunction was sustained as in
the above.84
(h) South Dakota. Order of the Railroad Commission regulat-
ing rates.8" A petition for an injunction on the basis of a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, was denied by the Federal
court. On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States
granted a temporary injunction with instructions to refer the case
to a master to ascertain the facts.8 "
(i) Michigan. A statute of Michigan provided, among other
things, that i,ooo-mile railroad tickets should be valid for two
years from the date of purchase and redeemable within that time
at the rate of three cents per mile. T After procedure in the State
courts in which the provision was declared valid, the Supreme
Court of the United States, upon writ of error, held it to be void
under the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 Fuller, C. J., Gray and McKenna, JJ.,
dissented.
The foregoing bare outline of facts is shown here void of local
coloring. The peculiar circumstances which gave rise to the laws
in question, the reasons which led the State courts to uphold them,
and the public opinion of the States which approved them cannot
be shown in this study, nor can they be fully understood by those
81 Siler v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 213 U. S., 175. Oct. Term, 1908.
82-Nebraska Rate Law, April 12, 1893.
83 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., 466. Oct. Term, 1897.
814 Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S., 537. Oct. Term, 1902.
83 South Dakota Laws, 1897, Ch. 110.
80 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S., 167. Oct. Term,
1899.
s7 Micligan Laws, 1891. Act No. 90, Sec. 9.
88 Lake Shore & Mich. Ry. v. Sinith, 173 U. S., 684. Oct. Term, 1898.
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living outside of the State in question, unconnected with the local
problem involved. In such a presentation as this we see only one
side of the question-the Federal side.
Within the past forty-three years twenty-five States have been
directly affected by Federal intervention under the Amendment."
This involved the annulment in whole or in part of thirty-two
statutes, nine city ordinances, and a portion of four State consti-
tutions. As to the total number of the fifty-five instances of
intervention, eleven were made under the equal protection clause
of the Amendment, six of these involving the right of negroes to
sit on juries; fourteen were made under the equal and the due
process of law clauses considered together; and the remaining
thirty were made under the due process of law clause alone, two
as deprivations of liberty without due process of law, and twenty-
eight as taking property without due process of law.
Although there are before us six hundred and four opinions
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States under
the Fourteenth Amendment, in fifty-five of which the Federal
government was allowed to intervene in the affairs of the State,
it is very difficult to formulate general principles governing this
intervention. The terms "due process of law" and "equal pro-
tection of the laws," for this purpose, mean nothing in themselves.
They gain their meaning only from the conditions and circum-
stances of each particular case. Matters of time, space and man-
ner govern their interpretation. They cannot be detached from
the concrete local environment.
However, we can trace the path in which Federal interven-
tion has heretofore moved and see something of its chronological
development. The first instance of intervention was in 1879,
eleven years after the adoption of the Amendment, when a law
of the State of West Virginia was declared void because it
excluded negroes from the jury service 0 In 1885 the enforce-
ment of an ordinance in California was restrained on account of
discrimination against the Chinese.91 In 1889 the State of Min-
nesota was restrained from enforcing its railroad rate law.9 2 This
89 See Chart II.
90 Strateder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S., 303.
01 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356.
92 Chi., MIR. & St. P. Ry. v. Minn., 134 U. S., 418.
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was followed by similar action as to the Texas rate law of I893, 9 3
and the Nebraska rate law in 1897.94
In 1896 the State of Nebraska was prohibited from enforcing a
law regulating the erection of grain elevators on the right of way
of railroads,95 and the State of Louisiana from enforcing a law
regulating the dealing of its citizens with foreign insurance com-
paniesY6 In 1898 the enforcement of one city ordinance in Ohio, 7
and another in Iowa,98 was restrained as taking property without
due process of law. In 19Ol a stock yard law of Kansas99 and an
anti-trust law of Illinois'0 were annulled. In 19o4 a law of
New York regulating the hours of labor in bakeries was declared
void.1 10 In 1907 the States of Georgia and Illinois were restrained
from collecting certain taxes from certain corporations. 10 2  In
19o9 the enforcement of the franchise tax laws of Arkansas, 0 3
Kansas,9 4 and Alabama,' and'a law of Nebraska regulating
railroad sidetracks and switches,100 were restrained.
We thus see that Federal intervention under the amendment has
gradually drifted away from race questions and has within recent
years entered other fields of State activity. It has become directly
related to the most serious problems that engage the nation. This
gradual development of intervention under the amendment has
not been accomplished without opposition, even in the Supreme
Court of the United States itself. In ten of the eighteen cases
above cited there were dissenting opinions.
We cannot answer the question as to how far Federal inter-
vention can go under the Fourteenth Amendment. We can see
how far it has gone, but a study of all of these cases fails to
93 Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S., 362.
9- Sinyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., 466.
05 Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Neb., 164 U. S., 403.
94 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578.
97i\Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S., 269.
Os Dewey v. Des Moies, 173 U. S., 193.
09 Cotting v. Kansas, 183 U .S., 79.
100 Counolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540.
101 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S., 45.
o102 Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S., 127.
Raymond, Treas. Cook Co. v. Chicago Trac. Co., 207 U. S., 20.
203 Ludwig v. West. U. Tel. Co., 216 U. S., 146.
104 West. U. Tel. Co. s. Kansas, 216 U. S., 1.
Pullmait Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 156.
105 Sou. Ry Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., 400.
106 3o. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S., 196.
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enable one to set limitations for the amendment in the future,
under the present Federal procedure. For practical purposes.
this principle of intervention may be stated in the following
words: No State can make or enforce any law which shall, upon
proper proceedings, be aeemed unreasonable by a majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This involves the inter-
pretation in each case of the terms "due process of law" and
"equal protection of the laws." The rule of reason alone gov-
erns. What are fair profits, what are excessive taxes, what are-
proper health laws, what is confiscation and what discrimina-
tion-these are questions which cannot be answered in the abstract
nor can they be adequately defined by precedents. If it becomes-
incumbent on the Supreme Court of the United States to pass
judgment on them, it must consider the reasonableness of each
concrete case.-
Charles Wallace Collins.
Washington, D. C., Alarch, 1912.
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CHART No. 1.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER AND CHARACTER OF
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CHART No. II.
TERRITORIAL OPERATION OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, I868--191I.
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